Thursday 15 August 2013

HIMPUNAN AMAN MEMBANTAH TPPA 'KEKALKAN KEMERDEKAAN, TOLAK TPPA'

Dibulan kemerdekaan ini, kami berbesar hati jika anda peduli serta ambil tahu tentang kesan buruk Perjanjian Trans Pacific Partnership (TPPA) dan turut serta dalam bantahan awam terhadap perjanjian yang berat sebelah ini... BUKA MATA, AMBIL TAHU !

Masa depan Malaysia adalah masa depan anda jua...

TUNJUKKAN SOKONGAN ANDA :

AKTIVITI : Mengadakan himpunan aman dan berarak ke Kedutaan Amerika dari Bangunan Tabung Haji (hampir dengan kedutaan).

TUJUAN: Public Pressure membantah TPPA.

MESEJ : BantahTPPA tajaan U.S yang akan campur tangan ruang polisi Negara dan memperjudikan masa depan negara.

TEMA : Stop Neo Kolonism. Kekalkan Kemerdekaan, Tolak TPPA.

TARIKH : 23/8 (bersempena persidangan di Brunei, serentak dlm masa seminggu bantahan dari negara lain).

MASA : 2.15 ptg.

Hadir dan beri sokongan !

Demi masa depan Negara. Mohon disebarkan !





AN OPEN LETTER TO THE CABINET



Badan Bertindak Bantah TPPA, a coalition of people-based organisations[1] - wishes to highlight issues and concerns which we fear will materialise if the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) is signed.

1. National Sovereignty and Policy Space of TPPA Countries: Various provisions proposed especially within the Investment and Regulatory Coherence chapters of the TPPA will restrict the policy and regulatory space of our government. We would be obliged to bring our existing and future laws and policies into compliance with extensive standards set forth in the 29 proposed TPPA chapters. These include domestic policy on financial, healthcare, energy, telecommunications, and other service sector regulation; patents and copyrights; food and product standards; land ownership and use (e.g. Tanah Adat, Malay reservation, forest reserve, etc.) and natural resources; professional licensing and immigration; government procurement, and more.



Failure to comply would subject us to lawsuits before an international tribunals – empowered to impose sanctions on us until our laws and policies are changed accordingly.



Under similar U.S. free trade agreements (FTA) provisions, billions of dollars of ‘compensations’ have been awarded by these international tribunals to various investors over toxic waste dump permits, logging rules, bans of toxic substances[2] and more. Currently, there are over $20 billion in pending corporate attacks on environmental, public health and tobacco policy under the existing U.S. FTAs —and the proposed TPPA would similarly expose us to such ruthless and expensive litigations.



Under the provision of ‘fair and equitable treatment’, all laws and policies may be frozen (standstill) to ensure investors will not be subjected to a regulatory environment different from that in place at the time they committed to their investments.[3]



Claims that our constitution, current laws and policies will not be affected by TPPA is unsubstantiated and have been disproven. Governments have been challenged by corporations for purportedly harming (expropriating) their investments through such non-compliance. Ultimately, compliance with the content of TPPA will entail amending our constitution, laws and policies.



2. Elimination of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers: The TPPA is about the complete liberalisation of goods, services and investments, with extremely few – if any – exceptions for Malaysia’s ‘sensitive’ goods such as its automobile industry and rice. In addition to limited export gains for Malaysia (due to such provisions as the Yarn Forward Rule, which favours the US yarn industry), the maintenance of subsidies by many TPPA countries for their domestic industries (such as dairy and soya) and the comparatively greater tariff cuts that Malaysia would have to concede, the immediate impacts of such extreme liberalisation would be felt by local producers and farmers who would face the onslaught of cheaper, subsidised goods from TPPA countries and lead to the loss of market share or even the eventual closure of some sectors.



Moves by TPPA countries to eliminate export taxes, on the other hand, would deprive the government of an important instrument for industrial development and trade policy, provide governments with additional revenue, improve terms of trade, ease inflationary pressure, compensate for devaluation and tariff escalation and most importantly preserve domestic raw materials for local processing to develop high-value added industries.



Similarly, the US has taken the position of insisting that all TPPA countries open all of its services to companies from their TPPA partners.



3. Government Procurement & SOE: Under this provision the government has to allow companies from the TPPA countries to participate in government tenders beyond certain thresholds and without imposing offsets. It was announced on 1st August by MITI that the thresholds[4] have been agreed at about RM23 mil for construction projects and at about RM 600,000 for non-construction bids in the long run. Beyond the thresholds we will be prohibited from allowing preferences for locals or set aside for Bumiputera or to otherwise pursue other socio-economic and national objectives.



There are no provisions for thresholds for Malaysian state-owned enterprises (SOEs or government-linked companies). Thus, all procurements by SOEs would have to be opened to all foreign companies from TPPA countries. To illustrate this, Petronas for example, will have to open every single tender for both construction and non-construction services to foreign companies from TPPA countries, and will thus not be allowed to exercise preferential treatment for local and/or Bumiputera vendors, suppliers, etc.



The concept of National Treatment – which requires all foreign investors to be treated no less than local companies – would be in force. Consequently, SOEs and EPPs (companies and projects under the ETP) which invariably are recipients of some form of Government’s assistance (grants, soft-loans, subsidies) may be penalised for such assistance when in competition with foreign companies from TPPA countries.



4. Labour Rights: The TPPA would prohibit governments from imposing conditions on the nationality of senior management personnel and members of boards of directors – thus, restricting governments from being able to implement affirmative action policies in general, and the recruitment and/or training of labour from groups or communities perceived to be in need of such affirmative action. In the financial sector, such policies have been crucial to the presence and participation of Bumiputeras in the domestic and international banking and finance.



Furthermore, there are proposals for the TPPA that have the potential of prohibiting governments from introducing new laws to give greater protection or promote workers than provided for in current laws. Even though there appears to be merits in the TPPA requirement for Malaysian labour laws to comply with the international labour standards, the reality is that such requirements would be overridden by provisions contained in other chapters. The labour chapter would thus appear to be toothless given the overriding priority given, for example, to the Investment Chapter.



Joint Statement: There may be provisions to stop governments from requiring greater protection (such as over minimum wage, health or safety standards) to workers in Malaysia than they currently do and prohibiting the imposition of training or employment requirements on foreign companies.



5. Environment Chapter: Similarly, the potential contained in the Environment Chapter to raise the standards of environment protection and promotion in Malaysia would be overridden by provisions contained in other chapters of the TPPA. Demands are being made on TPPA countries to agree, for example, to pro-industry, ‘self-regulated’ environmental laws; to prevent or make the transfer of climate-friendly environmental technology more difficult; and to investment protection measures that would expose Malaysia to the same challenges that in other countries have seen corporate interests trump environmental policies.



6. Access to Medicines: The US has proposed text, if accepted into the TPPA, that would make it easier for big pharmaceutical corporations to get medicine patents and obtain longer (beyond the standard 20 year-period) patents, which would also render it more difficult for ordinary Malaysians to access more affordable generic medicines such as for cancer, HIV and other essential medicines. Proposals to introduce data exclusivity (D.E.) in all TPPA countries, for example, would considerably delay the availability of information necessary for the production of cheaper generic medicines. Eighty percent of all government-supplied medicines are generic.





7. Capital controls, economic policies: There are concerns that the TPPA would limit the ability of TPPA governments to deploy capital controls, even during times of financial and economic crises. Capital controls were among those policy instruments that saved Malaysia from the worst excesses of such crises, as seen during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, and is an instrument that would undoubtedly be critical in addressing the next crises. While even the IMF has admitted to the advantages of maintaining safeguards on capital inflows and outflows to prevent or mitigate financial crises, the US have consistently opposed such restrictions.[5]



8. Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprises: The TPPA aims, among other things, at trade liberalisation and the lowering of tariffs which may cause drastic losses in jobs in all sectors (except perhaps one) identified for tariff removal. This will drive down workers’ wages and result in increased income disparity gap. Tariff reductions will impact on agricultural products, particularly. The more than 90% of Malaysian companies that are in the agriculture sector are SMEs will, therefore, face unfair competition from agricultural exporters from TPPA countries such as US, Canada, and Japan which will not reduce in the TPPA their significant subsidies to their farmers. Malaysia faces the spectre of suffering the same fate as Mexico, which – following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the US – saw the loss of three million out of ten million agricultural jobs.

9. Impact on Tobacco control and Public Health: TPPA has provisions that may prohibit or restrict any regulation on tobacco use and the tobacco industry. Such provisions conflict with the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) – a treaty Malaysia already a party to. To ensure public health policy space on tobacco is protected, tobacco must be excluded/carved-out from the TPPA, and no provisions apply to tobacco and tobacco products.



Similar measures and standards should be applied to other issues that have adverse public health repercussions.



10. Access to Knowledge: Just as the TPPA’s intellectual property protection measures will make medical treatment more expensive for ordinary Malaysians, TPPA countries’ educational and research activities could be harmed – and made more expensive – due to the more stringent copyright laws proposed, including for the ‘digital commons’ such as the Internet.



The TPPA is straddled unevenly between the hopes of a relatively small circle of multinational corporations whose commercial interests stand to benefit the most from the proposals, on the one hand, and the fears of peoples’ organisations in all 12 TPPA countries involved that their welfare and future are under threat, on the other.

In fact, the TPPA is not about fair trade, nor even about free trade, but about ensuring the protection and prioritisation of corporate interests above those of public welfare and safety and the socio-economic interests of Malaysians. . The language and substance of proposals for the TPPA seek the greatest role for multinational corporations, while rolling back the space for governments to act in the interests of their citizens and the formulation of regulations and policies. We welcome the commitments by the Minister of International Trade and Industry over the concerns raised by Malaysian civil society and other stakeholders. Yet, it has been acknowledged that there is much room for improvement and for further engagement with the issues at hand.

Bantah TPPA hereby calls upon the members of the Cabinet to suspend Malaysia’s involvement in the TPPA negotiations unless and until:
an impartial and comprehensive cost-and-benefit-analysis, a comparative advantage study, and human rights, legal, environmental and social impact assessments ha carried out, disclosed and publicly debated by all stakeholders in Malaysia;
the texts are examined, scrutinised and assessed by a Parliamentary Select Committee to verify the TPPA as negotiated is indeed in Rakyat’s favour and interests;
a comprehensive, transparent and meaningful consultation with all stakeholders; and
all concerns expressed by civil society organisations and other stakeholders, particularly those concerns raised herein, have been incorporated into Malaysia’s positions and proposals for the TPPA in the form of the Government’s non-negotiable Red Lines.

The undersigned,

Badan Bertindak Bantah TPPA






[1] List of the CSOs affliated to Badan Bertindak Bantah TPPA shown in Appendix 1


[2] Renco vs Peru


[3] RDC vs Guatemala (2012)


[4] GP/SOE & Bumiputera Issues Breakout Session briefing (MITI TPPA Open Day on 1st Aug 2013)


[5] See Letter (dated 28 February, 2012) ‘Promoting financial stability in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’, signed by more than 100 prominent economists.

Our Questions And Demand (WE NEED ANSWERS)


CIVIL SOCIETY DEMANDS & QUESTIONS

1) A senior official at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry updated stakeholders on the

state of negotiations up to the 18th round of talks in Kota Kinabalu. But where is MITI in this

forum? What is the point of this forum – given the many questions that the public and civil society

have about the TPPA negotiations – if MITI is not on the panel of speakers? Why are these

persons – none of whom have access to the content and substance of the proposed TPPA

provisions under negotiations – on the panel of speakers speaking on the TPPA? Is this merely a

public relations exercise on the part of MITI, while trying to escape the questions many people

have about the actual state of play at the negotiations? Why is MITI not on the forum of panellists

to answer questions?


2) Where are the other cabinet ministers in all this? MITI has told the public that of the 29 chapters

under negotiation, 14 chapters have been substantively concluded and their technical aspects

agreed upon. The ‘sensitive’ issues as well as the remaining 15 or so chapters have yet to see

substantive agreement and conclusion. This means that the matters now awaiting decision are at

the political level – the level of our decision-makers, the members of the Malaysian cabinet.

Furthermore, in addition to MITI, all of the members of the Malaysian Cabinet should be engaging

with civil society, other stakeholders, as well as the public at large, as our concerns are under their

areas of responsibility as ministers. While MITI is the coordinating ministry for the TPPA

negotiations, the voice of other ministries have been significantly missing amidst the public

debates and discussions in Malaysia over the TPPA. Eg. agriculture is among the most contentious

issues under negotiation and the fate and future of Malaysia’s 300,000 farmers and the country’s

food security and self-sufficiency are under question. Yet, civil society organisations have not

been invited or approached to consult with the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry.

Only a some ministries have held briefing exercises with civil society organisations on the TPPA,

but many others have noticeably absent in the discourse. Have they been adequately engaged in

the issue of the TPPA? Do they fear engaging with the public over the issues under negotiation?

They should be in front as panellists to explain to the forum audience and participants their

respective positions on TPPA: What do the ministries see as challenges at the negotiations? What

positions are we trying to defend? What proposals are we proposing at the negotiations to be

incorporated as part of the TPPA?


3) Malaysia previously had 58 redlines, which were the cause for the bilateral US-Malaysia FTA talks

to stop. Now, apparently many of these ‘redlines’ are of no hindrance. Everything seems to be all

fine and dandy and ‘all systems go’ for the TPPA. What has changed – including in Malaysia’s level

of development, economy and society – since 2007 that warranted these 58 redlines to have been

suddenly resolved and regarded as being of no problem to Malaysia anymore? Are they not

anymore relevant?


4) Given Malaysian government’s assurances that its policy-making, legislative and regulatory space

will not be constrained by exposure to international arbitration challenges, HOW and WHAT has

Malaysia proposed (or agreed to, if another country had proposed) to avoid cases such as Renco

vs Peru/Eli Lilly vs Canada/Ecuador vs Chevron/Ethyl vs Canada, etc. If such proposals have been

submitted, have these been accepted by all the other TPPA countries?


5) What has Malaysia proposed (and has it been accepted by all TPPA parties) to ensure that it will

still be able to undertake affirmative action without being exposed – as in the case of South Africa

– to ISDS challenges for violating fair and equitable treatment obligations and for discrimination

purportedly because of affirmative action in favour of a marginalised community?

6) Malaysia should not have to choose between its international obligations as enshrined in its other

treaties and agreements and the provisions of its free trade agreements. Leaked TPPA chapters

(and past US FTAs) show clear contradictions between the Framework Convention on Tobacco

Control (FCTC) and the TPPA. Health experts have concluded that the only sure way to safeguard

Malaysia’s current and future tobacco regulation and ability to comply with the FCTC is via a

complete tobacco carve out from whole TPPA. Since news reports indicate that the next round

could be the last round, will Malaysia table a tobacco control exception at the next round and

insist it be agreed to as a red line, as a non-negotiable position?’ Otherwise, how will Malaysia

ensure that it fulfils the obligations of that FCTC that it has ratified, given the provisions contained

in the TPPA that have been shown to treat tobacco as if it were just like any other good, and not

the destructive product that it is?

7) We call for a halt to all negotiations until all of Malaysia’s proposals and position on all the

chapters of the proposed negotiating text of the TPPA are presented to the rakyat and

Parliament. All texts, positions and information negotiated must be tabled and debated in

Parliament. In some of the other TPPA countries – where there are also shortcomings in terms of

transparency and secrecy – it has been suggested that upon conclusion of the negotiations, the

agreement is not signed until it is disclosed and debated by the public for a determined period of

time (, and a some kind of voting or referendum process is in place to determine the extent of

support for the TPPA. This should be done in Malaysia. While we are aware that trade and other

international treaties and agreements are constitutionally the jurisdiction of the Cabinet to ratify,

this is not a treaty that is confined to the traditional trade issues, but will impact broadly and

deeply on many aspects of life in Malaysia.

8) We have yet to see a cost-benefit analysis of the TPPA. There have been calls for the report by the

United Nations Development Program to be disclosed to the public so that the public can see for

themselves what UNDP had to say about Malaysia’s participation in the TPPA talks. On 15

December 2011, MITI had promised NGOs that it would release the UNDP report. This has yet to

happen. If MITI is concerned that the UNDP report would reveal Malaysia’s negotiating positions,

then MITI should release a legally-scrubbed version of the report. Otherwise, the secrecy just

leads us to assume that the UNDP report presents Malaysia’s prospects in the TPPA as very

negative.

A) Intellectual Property Rights

1. The TPPA must not contain provisions that reduce the ability of patients and government to

obtain medicines at affordable prices. It should not have any provisions that discourage or

prevent the viability and growth of production and use of generic medicines. (Patients to say

that they need access to cheaper generic medicines.)

2. We are against an IP chapter in the TPPA. If there is to be an IP chapter, it must not be TRIPSplus.

3. We are against the following US proposals that will make medicines more expensive:

4. Expansive patent protection for new forms, uses and methods of using

known medicines

5. Extension of patent protection beyond the current 20 years

6. Extension of patent protections to compensate for delays in issuing patents

7. Data exclusivity, including 12 years DE for biologics

8. Data linkage, linking intellectual property registration of drugs with approval

by the pharmaceutical authorities

9. What are the “principles” and common ground that make up the "principles paper" on

access to medicines tabled by New Zealand, Chile, Canada, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore

as an alternative to the U.S. proposal on access to medicines?

10. We are against copyright term extension.

11. What has Malaysia proposed – or agreed to – ensure its demands to provide affordable

access to education and educational materials is not hampered by proposals to increase

copyright protection, such as US proposals to

12. broaden copyright protections

13. lock in lengthy copyright terms

14. to create new rights that would limit efforts of libraries to share works with

the public or specialized populations, including students

15. to categorise libraries as an "internet service provider" (ISP) under the broad

definition proposed by the US in the TPPA and, therefore, subject them to

the ISP liability

16. We do not want Malaysia to agree to patents on plants, animals and naturally occurring

microorganisms. We do not want Malaysia to join the UPOV 1991 Convention. These would

go against our existing laws and have adverse impacts on biodiversity and farmers’ rights.

B) ISDS, financial services

1. We are of the position that Malaysia should not agree to the Investment Chapter. In case

there is to be an investment chapter, Malaysia should not agree to an investor-to-state

dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism or provision as this makes the government vulnerable

to claims and lawsuits from foreign investors of TPP countries. In addition to promoting a

system that would allow foreign investors to skirt/ignore/override national/domestic judicial

systems, it also accords foreign investors greater rights than national/local investors. Foreign

investors should not have more rights than local/national investors.

2. Given the huge number of cases of foreign investors challenging governments over

regulation, policy or law allegedly impacting on their bottom line, how has Malaysia

proposed to safeguard public interests without exposing itself to ISDS challenges ala Philip

Morris vs Australia & Uruguay? Will it be a red line to have a health exception, for example,

that is easier to use than Article XX of the GATT to apply to the Investment Chapter?

3. If there is to be an investment chapter, there should not be a provision on “fair and equitable

treatment”, nor an expropriation provision. At the least, there should absolutely not be a

provision on expropriation that includes “indirect expropriation.”

4. The chapter should not restrict regulation of capital flow; and thus this chapter should not

require free movement of capital flows.

5. What has Malaysia proposed – or agreed to – to ensure that there are effective capital

controls exceptions, in addition to effective health and environment exceptions? How have

these proposals been received by other countries? What proposal has there been to ensure

Malaysia can resort to exceptions in order to tackle financial crises? We ask that Malaysia

makes it a red line that it must have an effective, broad enough, long enough etc capital

control exception (eg to allow the kind used by Malaysia in 1997).

6. The financial services chapter should not require Malaysia to liberalise its financial services or

bind its level of financial openness.

7. It should not in any way reduce the ability or policy space of Malaysia to regulate the

financial sector, especially for the purpose of financial stability.

8. Malaysia should not be prevented from having maximum policy space to introduce or

strengthen capital controls over the inflow and outflow of funds.

9. The chapter should not require Malaysia to open up to the establishment or spread of new

financial instruments, especially introduced by foreign institutions, since the risks of this are

little known.

C) Labour & Environment

1. Higher medicine costs resulting from TRIPS+ provisions affecting access to medicines means

it is bad for workers

2. What has Malaysia proposed/agreed to to ensure that there is an effective labour exception

to the Investment Chapter and/or to ISDS provisions? If there is an investment chapter with

ISDS, there must be a labour exception

3. What has Malaysia proposed to ensure that any action taken to promote/protect workers –

such as a minimum wage law – is not shot down or challenged by foreign investors, such as

post-Arab Spring Egypt was challenged by foreign investors for its minimum wage law

through a bilateral investment treaty it had signed with another trade partner?

4. Given that other chapters in TPPA harm the environment more than environment chapter is

able to protect, we are of the position that Malaysia should not agree to the Investment

chapter and to all TRIPS+ provisions.

5. What has Malaysia proposed/agreed to to ensure that there is an effective environment

exception to the Investment Chapter and/or to ISDS provisions?

6. We do not want Malaysia to agree to patents on plants, animals and naturally occurring

microorganisms. We do not want Malaysia to join the UPOV 1991 Convention. These would

go against our existing laws and have adverse impacts on biodiversity and farmers’ rights.

7. There should not be any provisions that change our existing laws (i.e. Biosafety Act 2007 and

Food (Amendment) Regulations 2010) requiring the identification and labelling of genetically

modified organisms (GMOs) and products of such organisms, including GM food.

D) Bumipteras & SOEs

1. Highlight case of South Africa in relation to its BEE affirmative action policies – possible

implications for Malaysia’s Article 153

2. Will Malaysia exclude rice from the negotiations? Many of our rice farmers are Bumiputera

and will be adversely affected if the tarriffs are lowered. The existing tarriffs on rice should

not be lowered at all.

3. The TPP should not reduce the ability of government to regulate halal products. Therefore

there should be a carve out (exception) from the TPP for regulations on halal products.

4. There should not be any provisions or section on state owned enterprises, as these would

restrict their operations or viability.

5. Questions have arisen regarding the status of SOEs and definition of SOE in the TPPA. We

have SOEs that are have both regulatory and non-regulatory (e.g. commercial) functions. For

example, Petronas is a an SOE and a SCE, a regulator as well as a commercial enterprise. How

has Malaysia proposed to resolve that issue?

6. Our SOEs play a socio-economic role, such as to promote Bumiputera business welfare and

capacity. But Petronas’ activities may be seen as violating obligations on national

treatment/non-discrimination because of its assistance and treatment for Bumiputera and

Malaysian supliers. What has Malaysia proposed/agreed to to resolve this?

7. Non-commercial assistance – this will cause a lot of inconvenience to ensure other

companies are satisfied that they are not discriminated against. It will also affect Malaysia’s

ability to provide such assistance

8. What has Malaysia proposed/agreed to to ensure that disciplines on our SOEs do not harm

them/adversely affect their role as public institutions within the national economy?

E) Student job opportunities

1. Given the demands to impose a yarn forward rule, current average tariffs, ban on export

taxes on products to other TPPA countries, there will be job losses in downstream processing

industries, eg palm oil, furniture, steel, etc).

2. Stronger copyright laws will also lead to students being on the losing end of TPPA as it will

affect access to knowledge.

3. Will we have future jobs if our industries, agriculture sector, services are adversely affected

by premature liberalization?

F) SMEs, regulatory coherence, cross cutting issues

1. There are dangers for SMEs in the various chapters: goods, services and investment

(increased competition); IP: higher input costs; Government Procurement and SOE

chapter/section will lead to reduced demand due to more competition.

2. Malaysia has proposed an SME carveout for the GP chapter, we would like this to also be

exteneded to the chapters on goods, services, investment, intellectual property chapters,

etc.

Malaysian TPPA Red Lines. (DANGER ! DO NOT CROSS)

TPPA Red Lines Demands:

1. Chapter on Trade in Goods

(a) There should not be elimination of tariff (zero tariff) covering all products.
There should be exceptions for sensitive products (whereby if there is tariff
elimination or steep tariff cuts, the local producers will be adversely affected).
Thus there should be exclusion of rice, other food products, tobacco crop,
alcohol, automobile sector and other sensitive industrial products where there
is local production.

(b) There should not be a ban or restriction on export taxes. Malaysia depends
on export taxes to enable local processing and manufacturing of several
commodities, including timber, fisheries, palm oil. Export taxes are also a
source of government revenue.

(c) There should not be a “yarn forward rule” in textiles and clothing (whereby
clothing producers in Malaysia have to source their yarn only from TPP
countries, thereby raising their cost of production).

2. Chapter on Services.
(a) The services chapter has to include liberalisation on a positive list basis not a
negative list basis as being demanded. In the negative list framework, all
sectors are assumed liberalised totally unless placed on a “negative list.” The
danger includes that all new sectors (not listed) are automatically opened to
companies from other TPP countries; and existing sectors that later the
country decides it wants to develop domestically, are also opened up already.

3. Investment Chapter.

(a) There should not be an investment chapter.

(b) In case there is to be an investment chapter, Malaysia should not agree to an
investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism or provision as this
makes the government vulnerable to claims and lawsuits from foreign
investors of TPP countries.

(c) It should not restrict regulation of capital flow; and thus this chapter should
not require free movement of capital flows.

(c) There should not be a provision on “fair and equitable treatment.”

(d) There should not be an expropriation provision. At the least, there should
absolutely not be a provision on expropriation that includes “indirect
expropriation.”

(e) There should not be restrictions on performance requirements beyond those at the WTO.

(f) It should not bind state and local governments as a number of investment
disputes have already required national governments to pay monetary damages
for the violations of the investment protection provisions by state/local governments.

4. Government Procurement

(a) There should not be any government procurement chapter.

(b) If there is to be such a chapter, it must have provisions or effective exceptions
that allow for freedom for Malaysia to maintain policies allowing preferences
for locals, and for set asides for specific local communities, as according to
national objectives.

(c) If there is a chapter on GP, it should have high enough and adequate
threshold levels.

(d) It should also allow for offsets that are adequate.

5. Intellectual property

(a) There should be no intellectual property chapter.

(b) If there is an IP chapter, it should not go beyond the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).

(c) Most importantly, there should not be any extension of patent term.

(d) There should not be any provisions requiring data exclusivity, linkage between
patent status and medicine registration, patents on new uses or ban on pregrant
patent opposition, etc.

(e) There should be no copyright term extension.

(f) There should not be provisions requiring patents on plants, animals and
naturally occurring microorganisms. (This would go against our Patent Act
1983.)

(g) There should not be any provision requiring Malaysia to join the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1991 (UPOV
Convention). (Malaysia already has the Protection of New Plant Varieties Act
2004 which should not be amended by the TPPA).

(h) There should not be any provision requiring Malaysia to join the Budapest
Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for
the Purposes of Patent Procedure (1977), as amended in 1980.

6. Competition and State Owned Enterprises

(a) There should be no competition chapter

(b) If there is a competition chapter, it should not be enforceable via state-state
dispute settlement.

(c) There should not be any provisions or section on state owned enterprises, as
these would restrict their operations or viability.

7. Financial Services Chapter

(a) This chapter should not require Malaysia to liberalise its financial services or
bind its level of financial openness.

(b) It should not in any way reduce the ability or policy space of Malaysia to
regulate the financial sector, especially for the purpose of financial stability.

(c) Malaysia should not be prevented from having maximum policy space to
introduce or strengthen capital controls over the inflow and outflow of funds.

(d) The chapter should not require Malaysia to open up to the establishment or
spread of new financial instruments, especially introduced by foreign
institutions, since the risks of this are little known.

8. Telecommunications

(a) There should be no telecommunications chapter.

(b) Any telecommunications chapter should not have additional obligations aimed
at ‘major suppliers’ such as Telekom Malaysia (otherwise Telekom Malaysia’s
profitability and ability to achieve social objectives may be severely harmed)

9. Food Safety and Labelling

(a) There should not be any provisions (for example in a chapter on TBT or SPS)
that restrict the ability of Malaysia to regulate in favour of food safety; in
particular the TPP should not require changes to our existing laws (i.e.
Biosafety Act 2007 and Food (Amendment) Regulations 2010) that require the
identification and labelling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and
products of such organisms, including GM food.

10. Public Health

(a) The TPPA must not contain provisions that reduce the ability of patients
and government to obtain medicines at affordable prices.

(b) It should not have any provisions that discourage or prevent the viability
and growth of production and use of generic medicines.

(c) Tobacco control measures (such as regulations on cigarette packaging,
and on advertising of tobacco products) should be explicitly excluded from
the TPP.

(d) The TPP must not restrict the ability of government to require quantitative
ingredient declarations or health warning labels on alcohol in as large and
prominent manner as desired, for consumer/health reasons.

11. Halal Products

(a) The TPP should not reduce the ability of government to regulate halal
products. Therefore there should be a carve out (exception) from the TPP
for regulations on halal products.

12. Exceptions

(a) The exceptions chapter should have effective exceptions needed (eg for
financial crises, health, environment, consumer protection, halal etc) that apply to all chapters.

A Guide to the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) – Why BANTAH?

Back in 2008, the Malaysian government concluded the signing of a US-Malaysia FTA with 58 “unresolved issues”, which discontinued the two-year negotiation. Among leading protagonists was then Agriculture Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, who mentioned that he would not compromise the livelihood of local farmers. He was even quoted as saying ‘over my dead body’. YB Khairy Jamaluddin led a protest, citing that the FTA would take away Malaysia’s sovereignty, while patent protection would deny access to generic medicine. What has changed in the past five years? One thing for sure, it is definitely not the content of the FTA.
Why Trans Pacific?
We can imply that TPPA is called Trans Pacific because of the geographic locations of the countries taking part in the negotiations. TPPA is unique in the sense that it is open-ended agreement. Any country interested to join can join in as long as they agree with concluded texts and the other countries agree to that entry.
Every country participating in the TPPA already has existing FTAs with America except Japan, New Zealand, Malaysia and Brunei. Japan and New Zealand are developed economies with very large trade sizes with other countries in the world, and Brunei is a resource-rich nation with a less significant trade size. That leaves Malaysia, which has most at stake as a developing nation and a new entrant to any FTA with America. For countries with existing FTAs with America, the TPPA will probably just result in minor additions to status quo. But for our small economy, the TPPA will entail a much bigger impact.
The first TPPA negotiation was held in March 2010 amongst 8 countries, while Malaysia joined in December 2010, followed by Mexico and Canada December 2012. Recently, Japan joined in at the Kota Kinabalu negotiation round.
Other US FTAs with Singapore, South Korea and Chile serve as good guidance for us to know what to expect in the TPPA. Also, they do not vary much from each other, about less than 5% of variance on average. This clearly indicates, on the part of the Americans, that there is standardized ‘template’ and  that there is reluctance to entertain non-conforming measures (termed as “exclusions”) at the negotiation table.
The content of TPPA’s texts is confidential and negotiations are held behind closed doors. What we have are five leaked chapters, namely Investment, Intellectual Property, Trade to Barrier and Regulatory Coherence. MITI reported that it has almost concluded 14 out of the 29 chapters.
On Investment and Sovereignty
This is arguably the biggest chapter, with linkages to most of the other chapters. This chapter will restrict the policy space of governments through its ‘Investor-To-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’ and the ‘State-to-state Dispute Settlement’ (SSDS) clauses. ISDS is a provision under the Investment Chapter which will essentially allow any corporation to take the Malaysian government to court for claims to damages or losses. TPPA supposedly “strengthens” trans-national ‘corporate’ justice (fairness and equity). What do fairness and equity mean here? Basically, MNCs can expect no local condition or regulation changes affecting them once there reside in a partner country. But actually, it is ticket for multinational corporations to trample over national legal systems through international arbitration tribunals comprising of three judges; two international and one local.
For example, if Malaysia suddenly happens to find out that a certain ingredient in tobacco is harmful, and decide to ban it thereby affecting the profitability of a Tobacco MNC, the MNC has the right to sue the government for potential profit loss for the remaining period of their permit in Malaysia, with interest. Such was the case with Phillip Morris, when it sued the Australian government over a new law on cigarette packaging. The same could happen if Malaysia decides to be more stringent with LYNAS, for example.
We can even say that legislators and the Parliament will be left redundant; their hands tied to enacting only laws that would not affect MNCs’ profitability and business viability! We recall Mexico being sued for USD 16 billion for disallowing removal of toxic waste harmful to its environment by an American corporation.
It is also widely known that developed nations like America and Japan are attempting the ISDS via the TPPA. It was not ratified previously under existing World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Although we can only assume that these clauses were not ratified then for its potential negative impacts, there is still reason to be cautious.
On Government Procurement and Petronas Vendor Development Program
With this chapter, all government procurement including that of GLCs and Petronas cannot in any way favor local contractors in any way deemed unfair to other corporations. There is a floor threshold for this ruling; from previous US FTAs, we expect it to be around RM 23 million and above. This leaves room for only the small peripheral contracts for local companies. Meanwhile, the government procurement bill is sized at RM130 billion, or 25% of the Malaysian GDP.
Empirical evidence has shown that 94% of the American government procurement goes to American companies (Khor, 2008) and only 6% goes to over 170 companies worldwide. Such limited potential gains from what is supposed to be opening our doors to America! It is in fact our floodgate that is being opened for America. What will happen to our local contractors especially oil and gas contractors? Can even our giants like Sapura Kencana and MMHE at their nascent stages survive the competitive onslaught from developed nations? Not to mention the smaller players. Even the Petronas Vendor Development Program and licenses will witness its death.
On SMEs and Agriculture
Among other things, The TPPA aims at trade liberalization and tariff reduction, which may cause drastic loss of jobs in many sectors. A direct impact is downward pressure on workers’ wages, expanding even further the currently large income disparity gap. Mexico serves as a good reminder; following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the US, three million out of ten million Mexicans lost their jobs.
Tariff reductions will adversely impact particularly agricultural products. Promoting efficiency and healthy competition, however noble, becomes unfair when more than 90% of Malaysian companies in the agriculture sector are SMEs. They will face unfair competition from giant agricultural exporters from TPPA countries such as the US, Canada, and Japan, whose governments in the TPPA will not reduce huge subsidies to their farmers. A study by UNCTAD showed that subsidies reduce the price of American rice crop by 45% below cost of production, soybean by 32% and cotton by 52%. A rough calculation indicates that their rice can flood the Malaysian market at as low as RM1.40/ kg– what will happen to BERNAS, and more importantly, local planters then?
On Intellectual Property – Medicine Patent and Copyright
The Big Pharmas will get medicine patents and obtain longer patents easily. This would also render generic medicines more difficult to or delayed access, such as medicines for cancer, HIV and other chronic illnesses. For example, Herceptin which is used for cancer, currently costs RM8,000 per cycle and is used for 17 cycles. Treating a lung cancer patient costs an average of MYR 44,725 ($14,455) per year, per patient. The chance of access to these medicines for those unable to afford these exorbitant prices becomes slimmer as access to generic medicine is delayed through TPPA as developed countries may seek to extend the life of the patent beyond the 20 year period.
Just as the TPPA’s intellectual property (IP) protection measures would make medical treatment more expensive for ordinary Malaysians, educational and research activities could also be harmed and made more expensive due to more stringent copyright laws proposed. These include the ‘digital commons’ such as the Internet-based resources. Current copyright law is proposed to be extended from 50 years to 120. That’s also 70 more years of limited accessibility to students and academia due to prohibitive prices of book and references.
On Tobacco control and Public Health
Tobacco is not a product with our average demand profile– it kills at least 50% of its consumers prematurely. Malaysia, along with all other TPP countries except the USA, is party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which requires countries to regulate tobacco, reduce its use and withhold grant incentives to the tobacco industry. The FCTC is a binding international treaty and Malaysia has been a Party; this entails the aligning of national policies with the goal of reduction in tobacco use and regulating the tobacco industry. Many provisions in various TPPA Chapters contradict those in the FCTC. This alone is cause for concern considering the potential conflicts between the two in the future, and more importantly the general harm to public health of a more heavily tobacco-consuming society.
On Capital Control Capability
Another major consequence of the TPPA is restriction on our capability to enforce capital control. According to Reinhart & Roghoff (2009), periods of high international capital mobility have repeatedly produced international banking crises, not only as witnessed here at home and in the region in 1997, but also historically. When financial systems are adequately regulated, the scope for damaging financial cycles can be contained, or at least leave the economy less prone to such large cyclical swings as seen in today’s more liberalized environments. The idea is not to destruct efforts for a liberalized and efficient financial sector, nor to hinder Malaysia’s competitiveness in attracting foreign investments. Rather, it is to cushion impacts of economic shocks to the most vulnerable Malaysian businesses and entrepreneurs. It is not archaic to take some heed from temporary capital controls measures as undertaken during the Asian Financial Crisis. Even the IMF admits to the role that capital control played in expediting our recovery compared to that of Indonesia and Thailand.
On Telecommunications
A chapter on telecommunications is another notable feature of an FTA, which undoubtedly is discussed in the TPPA as well. The telecommunication plans to promote competitive access for telecommunications providers among TPPA countries. Telecommunication enterprises from other TPPA countries must be ensured access to existing infrastructure of a public telecommunications network through interconnection and access to physical facilities. In the case of Malaysia, we are concerned for the viability of TM Berhad who has been undertaking capital expenditure to wire-up the country expansively with high-speed broadband on fibre optics on a Public-Private Partnership basis. Providing access to foreign competitors on existing infrastructure will put serious strain onto TM’s business viability, perhaps even driving our local telecommunication giant into its doldrums.
The Issue of Export Taxes
Export taxes are imposed on importers of primary goods. It functions in two ways; it raises government revenue and develops local intermediary industries. Export taxes raise prices for raw materials in the export market making final products that we produce domestically, cheaper and more attractive than those produced abroad. TPPA attempts to have a say in this too. By reducing or abolishing export taxes, a country like Malaysia who still mostly exports primary goods will see partner countries enjoy our primary resources at much lower prices, thereby killing our local intermediate producers like fittings and furniture, palm oil refiners or food manufacturers. I will not be exaggerating to say that this sounds suspiciously similar to the days of our colonial masters extracting Malaya dry of its natural resources!
The Trade and FDI Myth
Back to trade itself, it has always been expected that the main benefits of signing an FTA with the US will be reflected through higher gains in trade benefits. How is it then that even in the case of a relatively stronger economy such Singapore, trade deficit had only widened from USD1.4 billion in 2003 when they signed the agreement, to USD4.3 billion in 2004 and USD6.9 billion in 2006 to USD10.5 billion in 2012?! Furthermore, no evidence of increased long term quality investments and FDI were found in bilateral trade agreements, according to a report by the United Nations. While trade diversion is a valid concern, the loss of incomes and benefits from trade diversion as a result of opting out of TPPA, must be determinedly greater than the various losses and costs that the TPPA entails to the larger economy.
Protests around the World against US FTA
It is not uncommon for nations worldwide to protest against FTAs with America. In Guatemala, two died protesting, and the people of Guatemala brought the government to court claiming that the FTA would go against at least 130 Acts in the Guatemalan constitution. In Ecuador, emergency had to be declared due to massive demonstrations. Chief negotiators in Thailand and Colombia also resigned from their positions in protest. In South Korea, a protestor burnt himself to death to show protest against an FTA that it had with the US, which only passed by Parliament after the ruling Government effectively locked up the opposition.
Countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland had also previously engaged in negotiations with America for an FTA, but they were never signed.
In Malaysia, the Third World Network (TWN) and the Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) have been at the forefront of engaging with US-Malaysia FTA issues since 2008, and has continued to do so with the TPPA. Notable efforts have surfaced again lately in light of the TPPA negotiations and the leaked chapters. On 6th of June 2013, YB Nurul Izzah issued a press statement questioning the secrecy of the TPPA negotiation and asked pertinent questions; whether Malaysia plans to trade its sovereignty for free trade. She continued to put pressure from Pakatan Rakyat which led to the setting up of a parliamentary caucus and increased engagement from MITI.
Simultaneously, momentum continues to build up with NGOs such as BLINDSPOT, MTEM, MAC, MTUC, GBM, IKRAM continuously engaging in forums and public awareness efforts. These efforts encourage the public to demand their engagement with the government in the negotiations. Other high profile figures like Tun Mahathir and Liow Tiong Lai also openly expressed opposition to the TPPA further fuelling efforts for public to engage in the issue.
BBBT
Badan Bertindak Bantah TPPA (The Coalition Act against TPPA)
Badan Bertindak Bantah TPPA or simply known as BANTAH TPPA is a coalition of 52 Non-Governmental Organisations and 7 Coalition Councils formed with the aim of raising the people’s awareness with regards to TPPA in a sincere effort to ensure Malaysia gets the best out of TPPA. Our view is that the TPPA is straddled between the hopes of a relatively small circle of multinational corporations, whose commercial interests stand to benefit the most from the proposals, and the fears of civil society organizations representing the people of all 12 TPPA countries. In fact, the TPPA is neither about fair trade nor even about free trade alone, since it seeks to lock in the monopolistic position of big corporations over their industries. It is about ensuring the protection and prioritization of corporate interests above those of public welfare, safety and the socio-economic interests of less affluent economies than the obvious economic master here, which is America.
We note that America is assisted by a special advisory committee of 1,000  industry experts. We demand the same for Malaysia. A coveted UNDP study is insufficient to ensure the public that our livelihoods and that of our future generations are not under threat. Given the track record, Malaysia is not exactly a master at negotiations, having lost Block L and M, a skewed water agreement with Singapore, Batu Puteh island to name a few. Negotiators from MITI alone cannot decide the fate of Malaysia.
Ultimately, BANTAH TPPA demands for the Government of Malaysia to suspend or pull out its involvement in the TPPA negotiations unless and until, an impartial and comprehensive cost-and-benefit-analysis and a comparative advantage study are carried out, disclosed and publicly debated by all stakeholders in Malaysia, that the texts are examined, scrutinized and assessed by parliament to rectify the TPPA as negotiated is indeed in Malaysia’s favour and interests, that the concerns are seen to have been incorporated into Malaysia’s positions and proposals for the TPPA; and that a popular referendum is held to determine to what extent Malaysians are in support of their government signing and ratifying the TPPA.
We demand for the government to adopt a transparent stance in this and for the voices of the various stakeholders amongst the people of Malaysia are considered in this negotiation round. Or else, pull out from TPPA negotiations in an absolute manner. A textbook outline of the benefits of free trade will not suffice; the TPPA may be a free trade agreement in form, but it is an imperialistic regulatory agreement in substance.
Attention and empathy is needed from civil society itself. Academics, industry experts, practitioners and even lay people who are concerned about the future of Malaysia must search, aim to understand research, speak out and write to contribute to current efforts to demanding the best out of our negotiations. Else, we really should be bidding our farewell to America and run for the door.